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        ABSTRACT 
 
Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False Prison: a study of the 
development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I 
expected some deep insights into W in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but 
overall it was profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature and 
since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal psychology, I expected this to be front and 
center in a work written during the golden age of evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much 
good recent work on W appearing. However one would never guess from this book that W or philosophy 
had any connection with psychology or indeed that there is such a thing as evolutionary psychology.  
Hence, I cannot recommend Pears works and recommend a framework for rationality totally lacking in 
Pears (and most writing on human behavior).  
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems 
view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-
book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 
367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  
Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p 
(2016). 
  
 
 
 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein (W) brings to mind a comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy 
professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him) which ran something like ‘Not offering 
the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I 
think of Wittgenstein as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was 
likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of 
the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were 
confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the 
next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form 
diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind 
over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short 
paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and 
pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and 
crossed out words so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this 
indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task 
of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after 
half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he 
became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a 
mistake and even nonsense and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of 
books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in 
which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract 
and condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of 
modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted 
him entirely; that to this day, half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who 
really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the 
situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False Prison: a study of the 
development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these 
facts I expected some deep insights into W in the current volume. 
There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly disappointing.  All of behavioral 
science is about our innate human nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our 
universal psychology, I expected this to be front and center in a work written during the golden age 
of evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much good recent work on W appearing.  
However one would never guess from this book that W or philosophy had any connection with 
psychology or indeed that there is such a thing as evolutionary psychology. If we understand that our 
brain, like our heart is governed by genes and functions automatically according to its evolved axioms, 
W and 
all psychology make sense. If not, then animal behavior is, to paraphrase Toynbee, just one damn 
thing after another. But Pears does not have a clue. He starts (page ix) by saying “How can our 
thought and language possibly have internal standards of correctness” and claiming that “This is 
the central paradox of Wittgenstein’s later Philosophy.” Of course everything in our body runs on 
“internal standards”(genes) and the paradox is that 150 years after Darwin, and with our every 
thought and action manifesting this, there are still people who do not get it. He tells us the 
writings of our greatest natural psychologist (which at age 76 and after reading countless 
hundreds of books and thousands of papers I still find some of the most exhilarating and brilliant 
prose I have ever seen) are “flat and platitudinous”!! What this means is that, like most who read 
W, most of the time he just does not really get the point. 
 
He starts with W’s early work, which, as all know, W later rejected. If you understand that it 
contains W’s first attempts to lay bare the foundations of our intentional psychology, and know his 
later work, the Tractatus mostly makes good sense, but if like Pears (and just about everyone else) 
you do not, then it seems bombastic nonsense. 
 
He tells us (p18) that it is very difficult to say what W’s answer to the question of linguistic regularity 
is, but I claim that it is totally transparent—our evolved intentional psychology, which W outlined 
with the greatest detail and clarity in over 20,000 pages included in his nachlass, most of it now 
translated and published in some 20 books and several searchable CDROM’s, all available on Amazon 
and p2p. In fact at the bottom of the same page he has a long quote which ends “What this shows is 
that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we 
call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases.” (PI 1 S201). It’s not an interpretation but 
regularity due to innate rules and W makes this point in countless ways throughout his corpus. Pears 
then says that the extra resource is “vaguely human nature” but there is nothing more vague about 
this than about the fact that our blood is pumped by the heart. 
 
On the next page he says we impose regularities on our thoughts to understand the world but our 
innate psychology is automatic and the cultural extensions are trivial (agency, causality, space and 
time, ontology etc are not modifiable). And so it goes throughout the book—obliviousness to the 
overweening dominance of our evolutionary psychology and conflation of it with our learned 
extensions.  This is of course the almost universal mistake of regarding humans as blank slates.  
Wittgenstein refutes it on nearly every page, if you know how to read him. The best recent refutation 
of blank slateism is Pinker’s ‘The Blank Slate.’ 
 
On p27 he says W rejects the a priori as the source of regularity, citing the above passage in PI, but 
this is clearly wrong in this case and shows a total (but extremely common) failure to get W’s 
constantly repeated point. At the bottom of pg 30 he quotes a passage he thinks is “cryptic” but it’s 
quite clear to me. W explains that we are hypnotized by the vague words “grasped in a flash,” which 
have various uses but we know perfectly well what they mean (ie, how they are used in a given 
context) and that is the end of it. As he says many places, the problem is not to find the answer but 
to recognize it as the answer. 
 Though there is much of value here as Pears has extensive quotes and good discussion, he ultimately 
always wanders off the path. In his discussion of private language, after 
noting W’s demolition of the concept of the private object, he says it’s too far reaching as it could be 
used to eliminate something that “actually did occur” in the mind.  He just does not get that there is 
no test for “actually did occur” in the absence of a public language. Again on the next page (57) he 
does not understand W’s famous manometer example which repeats this same point. Again, he 
correctly states (p41) that “His leading idea is that the language in which we report sensations owes 
its meaning to their connections with the physical world and cannot survive separation from it.” But, 
he does not tell us that this applies to all language about “inner processes” (ie, thinking, believing, 
intending, imagining, etc) and that the connections are the public criteria, without which we have no 
way to decide when a term is correctly applied. On p42 he says Stroud made a new interpretation of 
W’s objection, namely that we could not give ourselves an ostensive definition (ie, point to an apple 
to remind ourself of the word for it) but this seems to me to be just another way to state his 
objection. Isn’t this just the same as saying we have no criteria since there is still no test unless it’s 
shared (eg, how do we know that we remember the word correctly—we could have some mental 
quirk or get hit on the head and not use the right word or use several –this after all happens quite 
normally in our life and the cure is to ask someone or look in a dictionary etc.). 
 
Such mistakes are repeated thoughout the book and forces us to classify this as another 
contribution to the mountain of literature which gravely misrepresents W and by so doing, 
misunderstands our evolved psychology. 
 
Likewise Chap 4 on W’s treatment of logical necessity shows a near total failure to understand him. 
W commented in great detail from many different perspectives and made it very clear that logic, like 
language, math, music and games is an extension of our innate psychological axioms and he 
explained via long explications of examples how this works and how easily we are misled. 
Nevertheless, like most, Pears manages to badly confuse the situation time and again. Though W 
was not entirely consistent and clear (we are after all looking at unpublished and largely unedited 
notes) he spoke many, many times of the innate nature of our psychology (and logic) and definitely 
did not believe we “create” it (Pears p67). He pointed out with countless examples how we must be 
born with all the basic capacities of logic, math and language (thought) in order to create its myriad 
extensions. On p71 Pears says we can have no conception of reality in its “raw unconceptualized 
state” which happens if we “subtract our own intellectual contribution”, but it was W’s constantly 
made point that this sort of language lacks sense—lacks any clearly defined use in our life (e.g., what 
is the test that distinguishes between a “raw” and “cooked” view of a tree?). W noted that nearly 
anyone who starts to philosophize (ie, to talk about behavior rather than just behaving—ie, using 
words in context) immediately goes astray and this book, like most, illustrates this continually.  The 
very quotes that Pears uses give deep insights into this process, provided one has the insight to 
understand them. One has only to go back and forth between the (mostly) surgically precise 
dissections of examples by W and the (usually) vague generalizations by others to see the 
hopelessness of much behavioral discourse. 
 On p74 Pears attributes to W the view that “logically necessary truths are not tested in anything like 
the way that contingent truths are tested” but W clearly and constantly showed that there is not, 
and there cannot be, any test for the innate axioms of our psychology since they are themselves the 
basis for testing. On p78 he again shows a fundamental failure to grasp W (and so our intentional 
psychology) when he quotes from his RFM: “The truth of the proposition, that 4+1=5, is so to speak, 
overdetermined. Overdetermined by this, that the result of the operation is defined to be the 
criterion that this operation has been carried out.” Pears claims that this “new necessary truth is 
adopted arbitrarily” and that this sort of situation created a problem which W “tried, but failed, to 
solve later” but I claim that he solved it splendidly by showing that this “problem” instantiates our 
innate axiomatic psychology, which determines the necessary modes of operation of math, logic, 
language, thought and life. This is the most basic point about behavior and everything about life and 
the world, for nothing makes sense except in the light of evolution. 
 
On p91 he claims that W did “less than justice” to our natural tendency to our research and “proof in 
logic as the discovery of necessary truth” but in fact W exhaustively explores the operation of and 
relations between logic, math and language as “necessary truths” (i.e., expressions of our innate 
psychology), and states again and again that their extensions (i.e., all of math, logic, music, art, 
language, games etc.) are inventions, not discoveries. Otherwise, we have to say that Michelangelo 
“discovered” David in the block of marble and anyone else might have done so as well.  Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics and much of his other work explores the ideas of necessity and 
compulsion to get a result vs. prediction of results. We ought to keep in mind that W claims that all 
we can do is to give clear descriptions of how we behave (ie, use language, logic, math etc.) and that 
we cannot give explanations. Also, W’s point in his later work was not that certainty is based on 
“truth by definition” (Pears p93) but rather that if we comprehend a situation at all, the truth or 
falsity of statements about it come free with our understanding. Part of the problem is that Pears 
constantly refers back to the TLP, dragging its confusions into Wittgenstein’s later work. 
 
On nearly every page of every book and article in philosophy and to a lesser extent in all the 
behavioral sciences, much of science, politics, religion and everyday discourse, we see the same 
confusions that W so brilliantly described in his works beginning 80 years ago (with clear 
anticipations in his earliest comments nearly a century ago). Whenever people stop using language 
in the normal flow of life and try to step back and talk about behavior (language, mind, meaning, 
god, truth, the world etc.) they nearly always go astray. One of the many simple and beautiful 
statements of this is quoted by Pears (p42): 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in relief—but it 
can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that language can and 
only does refer to it. For since language only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from 
the world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Remarks S47 
Of course we have to pay our dues with years of study to understand this in depth—in our bones.  No 
pain, no gain. 
 
I suggest that those wishing to understand W, or anything deep about behavior, might wish to begin 
with one of his least studied works—‘Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics’. It will likely 
strike most as austere, boring, obvious, repetitious and trivial, when it is not hopelessly obscure, but 
for the persistent and perspicacious who approach it as what I claim it is—one of the clearest, most 
careful and penetrating analyses of the basic mechanisms of how the mind (language (thought), 
math, logic) works ever written, it will gradually open the eyes in a revelatory manner. The 
seemingly picayune belaboring of the obvious regarding proofs, propositions, meaning, and 
interpretation, with the aim of clearly describing (not explaining as W so often insisted) the actual 
role of these words (concepts) in our real practice, is the pain and the dawning of understanding of 
our mind and our life is the gain. 
 
In the last chapter on ego, though there are many good points, Pears again disappoints by failing 
repeatedly to get W’s point that when it comes to the first person point of view and our presence in 
the world, there are no tests, nothing that can make us say “Oh yes I was mistaken –I was not the one 
who had that pain!” E.g., on p125 he says that there are cases where “some doubt is cast on the 
referential character of ‘I’”, and on p127 that he is “unconvincing” and “implausible” in describing the 
difference between the use of ‘I” and “he” but W constantly stresses that there is no possibility of 
such doubt as the game of doubt applies only when there is a test and what test is there for the pain 
belonging to myself? Again on p128 Pears refers to “the usual criteria of personal identity” when W 
has exhaustively explained that normally we do not have any such criteria. 
 
Of course these topics are by no means easy and we have no choice but to take W at his word in 
each of his raw unedited notes, often isolated from a satisfactory context. 
However I have found that as one gets a better acquaintance with him (especially using the 
searchable CDROM of his English books as well as that of the entire German nachlass, both widely 
available in libraries and on p2p),  I find that W is rarely mistaken. W explains with many examples 
how we are led to misunderstand the role of language and give way to the pernicious urge to look 
deeper. Few can accept our innate psychology for what it is and resist that urge and Pears in not 
among them. 
 
Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may  download from this site my e-book 
‘Language Games of Philosophy, Psychology, Science and Religion - Articles and Reviews  2006-2016’  by 
Michael Starks First Ed. 648p (2016).   
 
